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Abstract 
Debates around abortion typically invoke religion and politics but there is no causal evidence of 
the impact of politician religion on abortion. Leveraging quasi-random variation in politician 
religion generated by close elections in India and controlling for the party affiliation of politicians, 
we find lower rates of sex-selective abortion in districts won by Muslim state legislators, consistent 
with a higher reported aversion to abortion among Muslims compared to Hindus. The competing 
hypothesis that this reflects weaker son preference among Muslims is undermined by stated 
preference data and by demonstrating that fertility and girl-biased infant mortality increase in 
Muslim-won districts.  
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1. Introduction 
Debates surrounding abortion often invoke both religion and politics. Yet, there appears to 
be no research that establishes a causal link between politician preferences and abortion outcomes. 
We examine whether the personal religious identity of state legislators in India influences abortion 
rates in the districts in which they are elected, controlling for their party affiliation. Our focus is 
on sex-selective abortion because this has dramatically increased in recent decades and, while 
access to safe abortion can be viewed as part of women’s rights, sex-selective abortion is a marker 
of discrimination against women and girls. In addition to the violation involved in killing girls 
before birth, sex-selective abortion is often harmful to women’s health because the procedures and 
facilities used are unsafe. Although abortion was legalized in India in 1971, illegal abortion is 
easily accessed and outweighs legal abortion by a factor of 8 to 11 (Jesani and Iyer, 1993). 
Women constituted only 48.5% of India’s population in the 2011 census, compared to 
50.8% in the United States. India’s Economic Survey of 2017-2018 estimated that 63 million 
women are “missing” from the population, highlighting this as one of the most pressing problems 
facing the country. A male-biased population sex ratios potentially have long-term consequences 
for the prevalence of prostitution and sexually transmitted infections, crime and violence, labor 
markets and old-age care (Samuelson, 1985;  Angrist, 2002; Ebenstein and Sharygin, 2009; Edlund 
et al., 2013; Amaral and Bhalotra, 2017). It reflects son preference in fertility, which Indians have 
exhibited for centuries (Visaria, 1967; Bhaskar and Gupta, 2007). Historically, families achieved 
this by continuing fertility till they had at least one surviving son (Clark, 2000; Bhalotra and van 
Soest, 2008; Filmer et al., 2009; Rosenblum, 2013) and by concentrating resources including 
nutrition and immunization on boys, while “allowing girls to die” (Sen, 1992; Klasen, 1994; 
Anderson and Ray, 2010). The advent of technologies that allow prenatal sex detection has led to 
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sex-selective abortion being used an alternative mechanism (Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010). 
Today, sex-selective abortion, son-biased fertility stopping and infant mortality of girls relative to 
boys are intricately related manifestations of son preference. A key point in this study is that only 
one of these involves abortion. 
 The sex ratio at birth in India has grown more male-biased since the mid to late 1980s 
despite rapid increases in income, improvements in women’s education, a decline in stated son 
preference, and the implementation of a ban on prenatal sex determination in 1996. One possible 
explanation for the unabated rise in sex-selective abortion is insufficient political commitment 
which, in turn, may be a function of politician identity. We begin by documenting differences in 
preferences over abortion by religion in India. In particular, Muslims have stronger stated 
preferences against abortion than Hindus, but similar levels of son preference.1  
We investigate the hypothesis that Muslim legislators, acting on their preferences, are more 
effective at reducing abortion than Hindus. To do this, we use nationwide survey data on the 
retrospective fertility histories of more than 450,000 women with more than 860,000 births over 
three decades. Our main outcome variable is the share of births that is female, a widely used marker 
of sex-selective abortion (Almond and Edlund, 2008; Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010; Almond et 
al., 2019) that provides more objective information than self-reports of abortion. Since electoral 
data in India do not identify candidate religion, we created a novel data base containing the 
religious identity of all candidates for state assembly elections in India during 1979-2010, coding 
religion from name (Bhalotra et al., 2014).  
 
1 Elicited preferences in the World Values Survey data for India reveal that Muslim respondents are between 7.2 and 
12.5 percentage points less likely than non-Muslims in India (who are predominantly Hindus) to agree that abortion 
is acceptable under conditions such as that the mother’s health is at risk, the mother is unmarried or that the child is 
likely to be physically handicapped. 
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We face two identification challenges. First, the election of a Muslim rather than a non-
Muslim politician is potentially correlated with the outcome of interest. To address this, we use 
the sample of close elections between Muslims and non-Muslims leveraging the fact that, in first-
past-the-post elections, there is a sharp discontinuity in the chances of winning when the vote share 
difference between the top two vote-winners is small, as a result of which the identity of the winner 
can be considered quasi-random. A standard regression discontinuity design (RDD) would involve 
comparing constituency-level outcomes across constituencies in which Muslims narrowly won vs 
narrowly lost against non-Muslims. However, our survey data identify only the administrative 
district and not the electoral constituency of respondents and so we match district-year electoral 
data to individual birth outcomes. To do this, we aggregate over all constituency-specific 
discontinuities within a district and use an instrumental variables procedure similar to a fuzzy-
RDD (Cunningham, 2021).2 We provide tests of the underlying RDD assumptions, showing 
continuity across the RD threshold for a rich set of demographic and electoral characteristics and 
that there is no evidence of manipulation at the threshold.  
The second identification issue arises from the possibility that the treatment (Muslim 
legislator wins, rather than non-Muslim) affects the outcome (sex ratio at birth) through channels 
other than sex-selective abortion. We address this problem by leveraging the fact that families do 
not attempt sex-selective abortion for first births. This has been documented extensively not only 
for India (Das Gupta and Bhat 1997; Visaria 2005; Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010; Anukriti et al., 
2021) but also for China (Chen et al., 2013) and among Asian immigrants in America and Canada 
 
2 A similar fuzzy RDD approach is taken in Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras (2014). Standard or sharp regression 
discontinuity designs based on close elections have been used, among others, by Lee (2008) to study incumbency 
advantage; Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) to examine the effect of party control on fiscal policies; Lee, Moretti and Butler 
(2004) to examine the effect of party identity on legislators’ voting behaviour; Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras and Iyer 
(2018) to study the impact of women’s electoral victories on subsequent women’s political participation and Baskaran 
and Hessami (2019) to study the impact of women leaders on economic growth and infrastructure.  
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(Almond and Edlund, 2008; Almond et al. 2013). We obtain results for higher birth orders 
differencing with respect to first births, which purges all impacts of legislator religion that are 
common across birth order. Our main specification controls for district, birth cohort and birth order 
fixed effects and for the party identity of politicians and we also show that the results are robust to 
inclusion of state-year fixed effects and district-specific time trends. 
Our main finding, in line with our hypothesis, is that sex-selective abortion is lower in 
districts with a Muslim legislator. We estimate that the election of one additional Muslim legislator 
in a district leads to a statistically significant increase of 0.7 percentage points in the probability 
that a birth is a girl at birth orders three or higher. The birth order pattern is consistent with previous 
work showing that sex selective abortion is increasing in birth order, being effectively zero at first 
birth and most evident at third births or higher. The impact of legislator religion is larger in non-
Muslim (mostly Hindu and Sikh) families, and among families where the first child is a girl, 
consistent with earlier studies that show these families are more likely to practice sex selective 
abortion (Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010). It is striking that minority group leaders are able to make 
a discernible difference to behaviors concentrated among the majority group. 
The main alternative to our hypothesis that abortion preferences explain these results is 
that Muslims have weaker son preference. We show that there is no evidence of this in stated 
preferences for sons. We investigate this formally, using the same identification strategy to 
estimate the impact of legislator religion on fertility since continuation of fertility has been shown 
to be a substitute for sex-selective abortion as a means of achieving the desired gender mix of 
children (Clark, 2000; Gangadharan and Maitra, 2003; Bhalotra and van Soest, 2008; Almond et 
al., 2013; Rosenblum, 2013; Anukriti et al., 2021). We find that, in districts won by Muslim 
legislators, there is an increase in the probability of a third or higher order birth. Breaking this 
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down, we see an increase in the chances of a third birth of about 1.04 percentage points which is 
(statistically) similar to the increase in the probability that a girl child is born, making it plausible 
that this is a mechanical reflection of the reduction in girl abortion. There is a further increase in 
fertility at birth order four and above, consistent with families continuing fertility in the hope of 
achieving a(nother) son.  
We also investigate changes in behavior at a third margin available to families to adjust the 
sex composition of their children, namely selective neglect after birth. Previous research shows 
that this was an important determinant of the historically higher rates of child mortality among 
girls in India (Sen, 1992; Oster, 2009). We find that the share of girls in neonatal and infant deaths 
is higher in districts with Muslim legislators. This is consistent with the Anukriti et al. (2021), who 
show that Indian families are substituting prenatal for postnatal selection of girls over time and 
back this with analysis of investments in breastfeeding and immunization. Our result here shows 
that this also acts in reverse i.e. when prenatal selection is reduced by the presence of Muslim 
legislators, then parents compensate by being more likely to neglect girls after birth. These results 
make it unlikely that Muslim legislators are acting on son preference, while being consistent with 
their acting on abortion preferences.  
To investigate the possibility that the results are driven by pro-female preferences that are 
not captured by son preference in fertility, we examined whether the election of Muslim legislators 
changes crimes against women, and find it does not. Since women legislators have been shown to 
be more likely to favor pro-female policies (Clots-Figueras 2012; Bhalotra, Fernandez and Slapin, 
2018; Baskaran et al., 2020; Lippman 2020), we benchmark our findings against the impact of 
women legislators, using a similar design leveraging close elections between men and women. We 
find that women legislators have no significant impact on sex-selective abortion or the infant 
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mortality of girls relative to boys, but that their presence results in a significant decline in the 
probability of a third-order birth. The results for women are consistent with the stylized facts that 
women have son preference and desire lower fertility than men (Ashraf et al., 2014), and they 
contrast with the results for Muslim legislators.  
Legislators can exert their preferences through formal channels such as passing legislation, 
monitoring adherence to existing legislation or directing resources to specific causes or, 
alternatively, through informal channels including deliberation, making issues they care about 
salient or providing information to citizens. In terms of formal channels, our results are robust to 
the inclusion of state-year fixed effects, suggesting that state-level legislation is not the primary 
mechanism. We find suggestive evidence that the impact of legislator religion on the birth sex ratio 
is higher shortly after the enactment of the federal Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic 
Techniques (PC&PNDT) Act that banned prenatal sex determination. This is consistent with the 
federal law providing Muslim legislators with a tool with which to achieve lower abortion rates, 
though this need not be the only or the main channel of their influence. We could not identify 
systematic data on enforcement over time and across districts, nor on expenditures relevant to 
abortion reduction.  
Informal mechanisms of salience and information are difficult to measure but our findings 
are broadly coherent with research that finds leader effects on fertility in circumstances where the 
leaders did nothing to influence it. Bassi and Rasul (2017) show that persuasive messages in the 
Pope’s speeches during a visit to Brazil led to reductions in contraceptive use of more than 40% 
and a 1.6% increase in fertility nine months later. Even if leaders do nothing, citizen reactions to 
leader identity can change individual behavior. Dahl et al. (2021) show that economic optimism 
led to higher fertility in Republican relative to Democratic districts following the election of 
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Donald Trump, the differences being sizeable at 1.1 to 2.6 percentage points. Using a lab-in-field 
experiment in India in which groups are assigned to either Muslim or Hindu leaders, Bhalotra et 
al. (2021) demonstrate that citizen behavior varies with leader identity, even after controlling for 
the actions of leaders. Beaman et al. (2009) show that quotas for women in local government lead 
to higher aspirations and increased educational attainment for girls. 
Our paper brings together two major strands of research. The first is a literature on the 
determinants of population sex ratios that has emphasized demographic determinants such as 
declining fertility (Das Gupta and Mari Bhat, 1997; Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010; Ebenstein, 
2010; Jayachandran, 2017; Anukriti, 2018), economic determinants such as land reform and dowry 
prices (Almond et al., 2019; Bhalotra et al., 2019; Bhalotra et al., 2020a) or institutional 
determinants such as female inheritance rights (Jain, 2014; Bhalotra et al., 2020b). Although sex-
selective abortion involves abortion, previous work has viewed it through the lens of son 
preference and not through the lens of abortion. No previous work, in India, or elsewhere, 
examines the influence of politician religion on abortion rates in the districts they are elected from.3 
In view of widespread international debate and media coverage linking abortion to religion, this is 
a striking omission.  
The second is a literature on the substantive impacts of politician identity.4 Most empirical 
papers have focused on the gender or ethnic identity of leaders and examined provision of public 
 
3 A literature on developed countries has linked abortion with politics and religion but has mostly focused on 
describing the preferences of different religious groups towards abortion (see, among others, Harris and Mill, 1985; 
Cook et al., 1992; Clements, 2015). The abortion debate in the United States has focused on party politics more than 
on the religion of the individual legislator. 
4 In the classical Downsian model, the preferences of politicians do not matter, and policy is determined by the 
preferences of the median voter (Downs, 1957). More recent models have modified and extended this framework to 
allow for the role of politician preferences (e.g. Besley and Coate, 1997). Many empirical papers have shown that 
women leaders prioritize pro-woman and pro-child policies (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Clots-Figueras, 2011, 
2012; Iyer et al., 2012; Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014; Brollo and Troiano, 2016). The evidence on politicians’ 
ethnic identity is more mixed, with some studies finding that leaders preferentially transfer state resources to their co-
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goods or outcomes like infant mortality that are closely tied to public goods provision. Our results 
are novel in showing that the religious identity of political leaders can influence household 
behavior with regard to fertility and abortion. Importantly, they provide compelling and rare 
evidence that minority group legislators can influence the behavior of the majority group. The only 
other paper we are aware of that investigates the effects of politician religion is Bhalotra et al. 
(2014),5 who are motivated by whether leaders target broad-based public services toward their 
own group, a question that has previously been asked with respect to caste in India (Pande, 2003) 
and ethnicity in Africa (Burgess et al., 2015).6 As the vast majority of Indian legislators are Hindus, 
our finding that Muslim legislators reduce sex-selective abortion suggests that weak political 
preferences contribute to the persistence of this problem. However, our findings of higher fertility 
and postnatal excess girl mortality at higher birth orders demonstrate that changing practices is 
easier than changing preferences. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes gender outcomes and the 
political environment in India. Sections 3 and 4 describe our data and empirical strategy. Section 





ethnics (Pande, 2003; Besley et al., 2012; Burgess et al., 2015; Kramon and Posner, 2016), but others finding no 
evidence of this (Kudamatsu, 2009; Dunning and Nilekani, 2013).  
5 There is relatively little empirical research examining the substantive impact of religious identity and even less 
examining its impact on gender outcomes. Meyersson (2014) examines girls’ education under the Islamist party in 
Turkey focusing upon party whereas we focus upon the personal religious identity of politicians after controlling for 
party identity. 
6 Using infant mortality and education outcomes as proxies for the effective provision of public goods, Bhalotra et al. 
(2014) find that these outcomes are better under Muslim leaders than non-Muslims. Importantly, the improvements 
are of a broadly similar magnitude in Hindu and Muslim families. 
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2. Abortion, Religion and Politics in India 
2.1. Gender and abortion in India 
We noted earlier that it is estimated that 63 million women are “missing” in India. In 
addition, it is estimated that a further 21 million “unwanted girls” are born in the parental quest for 
a son (Government of India, 2018), many of whom die early and unnecessarily. Male-biased sex 
ratios were noted as early as the first census in 1871 (Visaria, 1967), and female infanticide was 
thought to have been the major contributor (Dickemann, 1979). Decades of economic development 
have not rectified this imbalance, indeed the all-age ratio of males to females has drifted upwards 
through the twentieth century (Bhaskar and Gupta, 2007).  A more recent phenomenon, which 
motivates our study, is that the fraction of females at birth has declined sharply since the 1981 
census, even as the all-age sex ratio has stabilized in the most recent censuses (see Figure 1, panel 
A).7 A major contributing factor to this trend has been the introduction of affordable prenatal sex 
detection technology that has facilitated sex-selective abortion. The decline in the female share of 
births is particularly pronounced at higher birth orders and among families that do not already have 
boys at previous birth orders; there is no discernible tendency to sex-select at first birth (see Figure 
1, panel B). 
Abortion was legalized in India with the passage of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy 
(MTP) Act in 1971, which became effective in most states in 1972. The 1971 Act provides for 
legal abortion under specified conditions in the first twenty weeks of pregnancy.  In order to 
improve women’s access to legal and safe abortion, the MTP Act was amended in 2003 and again 
in 2021. Legal protection now extends, under specified conditions, to abortion within 24 weeks of 
 
7 There is a biological tendency for the sex ratio at birth to be biased in favor of boys, with more boys being born and 
more dying before reproductive age, with most of this adjustment being in the first five years of life (Fisher, 1930). 
However, the sex ratio at birth in India is unnaturally skewed in favor of boys. 
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conception and to unmarried women. Despite this, abortion is often harmful to women’s health 
because the procedures and facilities used are unsafe; illegal abortion is easily accessed and 
outweighs legal abortion by a factor of 8 to 11 (Jesani and Iyer, 1993). 
In response to civil society protests against widespread female foeticide, the Government 
of India passed the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (PC&PNDT) Act in 
1994. This legislation made it an offence to conduct prenatal sex detection, and imposed penalties 
on both citizens and medical providers for violating the guidelines. While there is some evidence 
that the Act had an impact on gender ratios (Nandi and Deolalikar, 2013), this has not been large 
enough to reverse the overall decline in sex ratios at birth. More recently, the Government of India 
has pushed for the importance of the empowerment of women girls, implementing programs such 
as “Beti Bachao, Beti Padhao” (“save daughters, educate daughters”) in 2015, which includes 
campaigns targeted to reduce and eliminate female foeticide (Dasgupta and Sharma 2021).  
2.2. Muslims and politics in India 
India is a country of considerable religious diversity and the constitution enshrines 
secularism by conferring the fundamental right to freely “profess, practice and propagate religion.” 
Muslims form the single largest religious minority in India, constituting 14.2% of the population 
in the 2011 census. Hindus are the religious majority, constituting 79.8% of the population. With 
172 million Muslims in 2011, India had the third largest Muslim population in the world. Muslims 
in India are more likely to live in urban areas (36% compared to 28% of Hindus), and their 
population share varies substantially across states and across districts within states. They are, on 
average, poorer than Hindus: 31% of Muslims were below the poverty line in 2004-05, much 
higher than the figure of 21% for upper-caste Hindus and comparable to the figure of 35% for 
lower castes (Government of India, 2006). Using our purpose-built data on the religion of Indian 
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state legislators, we find that only 5.6% of electoral constituencies in a district were won by 
Muslims over the period 1979-2010, substantially lower than their population share.  
India is a federal country in which the constitution grants substantial policy autonomy to 
the 29 states. Indian states largely determine their own health and education budgets, although they 
receive supplementary funds from federal programs, and the federal government can also pass 
some health-related legislation. State legislators can shape outcomes in their districts in many 
ways. For example, they can spend discretionary funds on local public works (Keefer and 
Khemani, 2009), or influence federally funded development programs, such as the public works 
program NREGA (Gupta and Mukhopadhyay, 2014) or the effective implementation of policies 
and the supply of public services (Baskaran et al., 2015; Min, 2015). Elections to state legislatures 
are held every five years on a first-past-the-post basis in single-member constituencies. Explicitly 
Islamic parties win very few elections in India, but among the national and prominent regional 
parties, some parties appeal more to Hindus than to Muslims. While India has political quotas for 
low castes in state assemblies and local governments, there are no political quotas for Muslims.8  
2.3. Abortion and gender preferences by religion 
Islam places a high priority on the sanctity of life, and this principle leads all schools of 
Islam to oppose abortion after the first 120 days of pregnancy. Views differ across different schools 
and scholars on the acceptability of abortion before this stage, with many scholars holding the 
view that life begins at conception. Infanticide is also severely discouraged. Previous research has 
shown that infant mortality rates are lower for Muslim children compared to Hindus, despite 
Muslims being poorer and less educated (Bhalotra, Valente and van Soest, 2010), and that Muslim 
 
8 Jensenius (2013) discusses the historical reasons underlying the absence of electoral quotas for Muslims.  
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families are less likely than Hindu and Sikh families to commit sex-selective abortion (Almond et 
al., 2013; Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010). Using the World Values Survey data for India, we find 
that even after controlling for age, gender, education and wealth, Muslim respondents are 
significantly less likely to agree that abortion is acceptable under a range of scenarios (Table 1, 
columns 1-4). For instance, while 69% of Hindus agree that abortion is acceptable if the child is 
handicapped, the fraction is 12.5 percentage points lower for Muslim respondents.  
We find no evidence that Muslims have lower son preferences than non-Muslims. The 
NFHS data we use show that Muslims report a desire for more sons and more daughters (higher 
desired fertility) but the desired share of boys among all children is similar and just slightly higher 
among Muslim families (Table 1, columns 5-7). Using data from the World Values Surveys for 
India, we find that Muslims are significantly less likely to agree with the statement “both the 
husband and wife should contribute to household income,” but no more likely than Hindus to say 
that “A university education is more important for a boy than a girl” (Appendix Table A1, columns 
1 and 2). There is also no significant difference between Muslims and Hindus on whether they 
agree with the statements “Men make better political leaders than women do” and “Men make 
better executives than women do” (columns 3 and 4). 
 
3. Data  
3.1. Data on politician religion 
We constructed a unique dataset that identifies all candidates for state legislative assembly 
elections by their religion. We used data on state legislative elections provided by the Election 
Commission of India that list the name, constituency, political party, and votes obtained by every 
candidate for all elections from 1979-2010. We inferred religious identity from candidate names 
 14 
(first names and surnames) and classified candidates as Muslim or non-Muslims. While Muslim 
names are often readily identifiable, it is difficult to distinguish Hindu names from those of other 
religious minorities such as Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists or Christians who constitute approximately 6% 
of India’s population. Thus, we effectively compare Muslim legislators to those of all other 
religions, with Hindus being the most numerous among them.9 
To minimize errors, we used two independent teams to conduct this classification of 
legislator names. The first team used a software program called “Nam Pehchan,” which could 
classify about 72% of the names; the rest were classified manually. A second (India-based) team 
performed the whole classification manually, using their judgment gained from prior work with 
Election Commission files.  Disagreements between the two classifications were resolved by the 
authors on a case-by-case basis. After this procedure, we remained doubtful of the religious 
identity of less than 0.5% of candidate names (out of more than 250,000 names), and classified 
them as “non-Muslim” as a tie-breaking rule. These data were first used in Bhalotra et al. (2014). 
3.2.  Data on birth outcomes 
We use retrospective fertility data from the National Family Health Survey of India 
(NFHS), a nationally representative survey that is one of the multi-country Demographic and 
Health Surveys. We pool the two most recent waves that have district identifiers: the second wave 
(NFHS2), conducted in 1998-1999, and the fourth wave (NFHS4), conducted in 2015-16).10 
Women aged 15-49 at the time of the survey are asked to record their complete fertility histories 
and any child deaths. This enables us to identify the gender at birth of each child, whether the child 
 
9 Observed gender ratios among Sikhs are worse than among Hindus. Christians are similar to Muslims in being 
opposed to abortion; therefore, pooling Christian legislators with Hindus will lead to the under-estimation of the 
impact of Muslim relative to Hindu legislators. 
10 The third NFHS wave conducted in 2005-06 does not have district identifiers, and the first NFHS wave (1992-93) 
covers fewer households and a smaller time period.  
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died within the first month of life (neonatal mortality) and whether the child died in the first year 
of life (infant mortality).  
While legislators win electoral constituencies, the lowest geographic level at which we 
have information on birth outcomes is the administrative district of residence of the respondent 
mother. Almost all state electoral constituencies are contained within district boundaries and the 
average number of constituencies per district is 10. The map in Appendix Figure A3 illustrates the 
match between electoral constituencies and administrative districts. It shows the district of 
Ghaziabad, which has eight electoral constituencies. We match electoral to birth outcome data by 
aggregating the electoral data to the district level using the administrative district boundaries in 
the 1991 census. We then study variation generated by close elections (discussed below) in the 
fraction of legislators in the district who are Muslim.  
In our main specification, we restrict the analysis to the 16 largest states in India that 
contain more than 95% of India’s population, and 94% of the Indian Muslim population in India. 
The key exclusion here is the one Muslim-majority state of Jammu & Kashmir, but we verify that 
our results are robust to its inclusion.11 The analysis is conducted for births over the three-decade 
period 1980-2011; note that most of the births in the first decade are from NFHS2, and most of the 
births in the third decade are from NFHS4 (see histogram in Appendix Figure A2). Since many 
administrative districts undergo geographical splits over time, we aggregate these districts back to 
1981 district boundaries for our analysis. Our main regression sample has data on 861,010 births 
for 321,924 mothers across 347 districts.  
 
 
11 Jammu &Kashmir is also exceptional in being the scene of a long-running dispute between India and Pakistan. This 
state had its elected assembly suspended for several years, and many special laws apply solely to this state, while some 
national laws do not apply to it. Most of the state’s autonomy provisions were scrapped by the federal government in 
2019. 
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3.3. Defining birth outcomes  
We conceptualize a family as making the following sequence of choices: whether to 
conceive; conditional upon conception, whether to engage in prenatal sex detection; conditional 
upon knowing fetal sex, whether to abort; and conditional upon not aborting, how much to invest 
in children and in particular, whether to invest differently in sons and daughters. The main outcome 
of interest is an indicator variable for whether a birth is a girl, a widely used marker of sex-selective 
abortion. Official data are likely to under-report abortions, since most abortions do not take place 
in health facilities (Singh et al., 2018), and survey data are subject to potentially endogenous under-
reporting.  
So as to check whether any change in live girl births (relative to boys) is offset or reinforced 
by changes in girl relative to boy mortality after birth, we examine neonatal and infant mortality, 
defined as dummies for whether the child died in the first month and the first year of life 
respectively. Child mortality rates are often used as indicators of post-birth investments in children 
in developing countries where mortality rates are high and sensitive to parental investments.  
Sex at birth and mortality after birth are both conditional on the occurrence of a birth 
(fertility). We model fertility using a dummy for whether the individual mother has a birth in a 
given year. As explained earlier, this is relevant to testing whether the selective abortion of girls 
falls under Muslim legislators because families decide they want more girls, or because they pursue 
sons by continuing fertility. We expand the data to create a mother-year panel, the length of which 
is the duration of her reproductive years (which we assume starts at age 15) and conditioning on 
time since last birth. Since fertility decisions are typically made in the year before the child is born, 
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we match all birth outcomes to the district-level share of Muslim legislators in the year before 
birth.12  
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
4.1. Identification using close elections 
We want to estimate the impact of the Muslim legislators winning in a district on the birth 
outcomes of households living in that district in a given year. In general, the election of Muslims 
rather than non-Muslims is likely to be correlated with constituency (or district) characteristics, 
including demographics (share of Muslims), political circumstances and voter preferences. We 
address this by using the sample of constituencies in which Muslims contest against non-Muslims 
in a close contest, exploiting the sharp discontinuity in the chances of winning at the zero-vote 
margin. This ensures that constituency characteristics, demographics, political circumstances, 
voter preferences, and issue salience that may be generated by the fact of a close contest are 
balanced across constituencies in which a Hindu vs a Muslim wins a close election.  
However, as noted earlier, we cannot use the sharp RDD because we do not have outcome 
data at the constituency level. Instead, we aggregate over all constituency-specific discontinuities 
within a district and use a two-stage least squares approach. The explanatory variable is 
transformed from a dummy for a Muslim winner to the fraction of all seats won by Muslim 
legislators in a district. We instrument this with the fraction of seats in the district won by Muslim 
politicians in close elections against non-Muslim politicians. We define close elections as elections 
in which the winner won by a margin of less than 3% of votes, and investigate alternative vote 
 
12 Since the data record district of residence rather than district of birth, we restrict the sample to children who were 
conceived in their current location. Approximately 22.7% of the survey respondents in our pooled sample moved to 
their current area of residence after the child was conceived. 
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margins as a robustness check. 1581 district-year observations in our data (14%) feature a close 
inter-religious election; of these, approximately half result in a Muslim winning the close election 
(see summary statistics in Appendix Table A2). As in the standard RDD, our regressions control 
for a second-order polynomial in the vote margin but now we include polynomials in as many vote 
margins as there are constituencies in the district. We show that results are robust to dropping the 
margin controls (Table A6), and to a specification where we control for a linear function of the 
margins and we restrict the sample to district-years that had close elections (Table 3, column 5).  
4.2. Empirical specification 
The instrumental variables (IV) regression equation is as follows, where equation (1) is the 
second stage and equation (2) is the first stage: 
(1) Yidst=  θds + ψt + β MLds,t-1 + λTCds,t-1 + ΣNdj=1 α1j Ijds,t-1*G(mjds,t-1)+ ΣNdj=1 α2j Ijds,t-1 +   Xidst η + εidst 
(2) MLds,t-1 = θds + ψt + κMCds,t-1 + μTCds,t-1 + ΣNdj=1ϑ1j Ijds,t-1*G(mjds,t-1)+ ΣNdj=1 ϑ2j Ijds,t-1 +Xidst σ + uds,t-1  
 
where Yidst is the dependent variable for mother i giving birth in district d of state s and year t. The 
outcomes we model include dummy variables indicating a girl child in a sample of all births, 
indicating a birth in a sample of all reproductive age women, and indicating a girl child in a sample 
of all infant and neonatal deaths. The explanatory variable of interest is MLds,t-1, the fraction of 
constituencies in the district in which a Muslim legislator was elected in district d in the year before 
birth, t-1, the lag allowing for conception, prenatal sex detection, and abortion decisions being 
made a year before the birth outcome is realized. The coefficient of interest is β, which identifies 
the impact of Muslim relative to non-Muslim legislators. 
The share of all constituencies won by Muslim legislators MLds,t-1 is instrumented with the 
share of constituencies in the district won by Muslims in close elections against non-Muslims in 
the same year, MCds,t-1. The fraction of constituencies in the district in which there were close 
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elections between Muslims and non-Muslims, TCds,t-1, is controlled for in the second stage 
(equation 1) and partialled out of the instrument in the first stage (equation 2). The margin of 
victory for an inter-religious contest in constituency j of district d is denoted mjds,t-1, defined as the 
vote share of the Muslim candidate minus the vote share of the non-Muslim candidate, so that by 
construction, a Muslim wins when the margin is positive. We control for second order polynomials 
of each constituency-level margin of victory in all constituencies with inter-religious elections in 
a district, denoted G(mjds,t-1). The polynomials are interacted with Ijds,t-1, which is an indicator for 
whether there was an inter-religious contest in constituency j of district d. We also include indicator 
variables for whether there are inter-religious races; Nd is the total number of constituencies in 
district d.  
θds represents district fixed effects, which control for time-invariant district characteristics 
including the history of Muslim presence in the district, sluggish demographic characteristics 
including the share of the district population that is Muslim, the slowly moving component of 
public goods infrastructure and time-invariant voter preferences. Cohort (year-of-birth) fixed 
effects ψt afford a flexible representation of aggregate shocks or nationwide policies that may have 
influenced both birth outcomes and the religion mix of politicians. Xidst is a vector of mother 
characteristics including dummies for rural residence, education categories, categorical variables 
for mother height and age at marriage13 and whether the mother belongs to a scheduled caste or 
tribe (which we loosely refer to as “low caste”) or to the “Other Backward Castes.” To allow 
 
13 Since there were many missing observations for mother height (a measure of her nutritional and health status) and 
age at marriage, we created categorical variables to avoid losing data. For height, the categories are the four quartiles 
of available height measures and a fifth category for missing data. For age at marriage, we have the following 
categories: married before age 15, married between ages 15 and 17, married between ages 18 and 20, married at age 
21 or later and missing (which would include unmarried women). The legal age of marriage for women in India is 18. 
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outcomes in a district to be correlated across families in the district and across time, the standard 
errors are clustered at the district level.14  
To summarize, the thought experiment generated by our estimation strategy is that one or 
more Muslim legislators win in close elections against non-Muslims (conditional upon the 
occurrence of a close election), exogenously increasing the fraction of seats with Muslim 
legislators. The hypothesis we test is that this will result in lower rates of sex-selective abortion in 
the district from which the legislator is elected. For convenience equation (1) does not display 
interactions by birth order but, for the reasons explained in section 1, we interact legislator religion 
with birth order in order to purge influences common across birth order such as on health (shown 
in Bhalotra et al. 2014), and to thereby isolate influences on sex-selective abortion which we know 
is conducted for higher parity births but not for first births.  
4.3. Validity of the identification strategy  
 In this section we first present tests of the validity of the RDD that underlies our IV 
identification strategy (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) and then point to evidence to defend the 
additional identifying assumption that the sex of the first born child is conditionally randomly 
assigned.  
RDD tests: First, we test for vote manipulation around the zero vote margin and find that 
the vote margin is continuous in the neighborhood of zero, the threshold which separates the 
Muslim victory from the non-Muslim victory (Figure 3A). A formal test estimating the difference 
in the densities on either side of the zero point (McCrary, 2008) confirms this, the estimated 
difference being a statistically insignificant -0.0038 (Figure 3B). Second, we examine whether 
 
14 Our explanatory variable varies at the level of the district and election year. Strictly speaking, we should therefore 
cluster standard errors at the district x election term level. Our district-level clustering is therefore a stricter 
specification, and likely to overestimate standard errors. 
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constituency demographics vary discontinuously at the zero -vote margin, in the spirit of a test of 
balance between treated constituencies (in which a Muslim narrowly won against a non-Muslim) 
and control constituencies (in which a non-Muslim narrowly won against a Muslim). Using 
demographic characteristics from the 2001 census at the constituency level, we show RDD plots 
for the fraction of the population that is urban, the fraction of population belonging to Scheduled 
Castes and Tribes, the female population share and the average literacy rate (Figures 4A-4D). 
These characteristics are graphed against the victory margin on the x-axis, with the lines 
representing a non-parametric (lowess) fit on either side of the discontinuity. None of these 
characteristics exhibits a discontinuity at the zero-vote margin. The share of Muslims in the 
population (at district level) is also continuous across the zero-margin threshold (Figure 4E).  
 Third, we examine political characteristics of the constituency, and find that electoral races 
with Muslim winners are not significantly different from those with non-Muslim winners in terms 
of total votes cast, number of candidates and the participation of Muslims and women as candidates 
(Figures 5A-5D). However, Figures 5E-5G show that Muslim winners, even in close elections, are 
significantly more likely to belong to the Indian National Congress (INC) party or the Bahujan 
Samaj Party (BSP), and significantly less likely to belong to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This 
is not surprising, given that the BJP often espouses a vision of India as a Hindu nation while the 
other parties do not. There is no difference in the probability of Muslim winners belonging to 
Communist parties (Figure 5H). In all regressions, we include controls for the fraction of seats in 
the district won by the INC, the BJP and the BSP, ensuring that the effect we capture is the effect 
of the personal religious identity of legislators, over and above any political party effect. We 
further verify that Muslim winners are not more likely to be incumbents compared to non-Muslims, 
which rules out incumbency effects explaining our results (Figure 5I). 
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 Although the close election strategy does not require balance on other personal 
characteristics, it is useful for interpretation of the estimates to consider how the characteristics of 
Muslim vs non-Muslim legislators who win in close races against the other religion compare. Data 
on candidate characteristics are only available after 2003. Using data from 2004 to 2007, we find 
no significant differences in education levels, net worth (assets minus liabilities) or the likelihood 
of having serious criminal charges pending against them (Appendix Figure A4). While we do not 
find any differences in these observable characteristics, we cannot rule out that Muslim winners 
have different unobservable characteristics.  However, to compete with our interpretation that sex 
ratios improve under Muslim leaders because of their preferences against abortion, such    
unobservables would need to be correlated with preferences over abortion.  
Tests of random assignment of sex of first births:  Using the NFHS surveys, the same 
data source used in this study, Anukriti et al. (2021) demonstrate support for this identifying 
assumption. They show that families with firstborn boys and firstborn girls are similar on a rich 
set of observables (Table 2 of their paper), that the share of girls among first births has not 
decreased over time in sharp contrast to the share of second and higher order births, and that this 
holds conditional and unconditional upon indicators for availability of prenatal sex detection and 
for the socioeconomic status of the family. Similar evidence is provided in earlier studies as well 
(Das Gupta and Bhat 1997; Visaria 2005;  Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010; Almond et al., 2013). It 
lines up with the fertility preference data that we display in Table 1 which shows that Indian 
families want, on average, about 1 girl and 1.3 boys. It follows that the average family is not 
unhappy to have a girl at first birth but if desired family size is in the region of 2.3 then they have 
an incentive to sex-select after the first birth. This also explains why declines in desired or 
permitted fertility exacerbate sex selection (Ebenstein, 2010; Jayachandran, 2017).  
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4.4. First stage relationship  
We now verify that aggregation of constituencies to districts does not invalidate our 
empirical strategy. A particular concern is that, if a Muslim winning a close election in a district 
was always matched by another Muslim candidate losing a close election in the same district, then 
the results of close elections would not change the district fraction of Muslim legislators. Figure 
2A plots the average fraction of seats won by Muslim legislators in the district against the victory 
margin, defined as the difference in vote share between the Muslim and the non-Muslim candidates 
in each one of the electoral constituencies of the district, so that margin > 0 denotes a Muslim 
electoral victory and margin < 0 denotes a Muslim loss. We see that when a Muslim narrowly wins 
against a non-Muslim (i.e. when the vote margin is just larger than zero), there is a dramatic jump 
in the district share of Muslim legislators. In other words, if a Muslim wins a close election in any 
electoral constituency within a district, then the overall fraction of Muslim legislators in the 
(larger) administrative district rises significantly. This first stage effectively aggregates across all 
these points that are near the discontinuity. The first stage regression results, estimates of equation 
(2) above, are shown in Appendix Table A4, and they confirm that the instrument is a strong 
predictor of the fraction of Muslim legislators in a district.   
4.5. External validity 
Although the use of close elections ensures the internal validity of our estimates, the 
occurrence of close elections between Muslims and non-Muslims in a given district and year may 
not be randomly assigned. In particular, close inter-religious elections are more likely to occur in 
areas with a higher population fraction of Muslims; these areas tend to be more urban and have a 
lower population share of Scheduled Tribes, due to the pre-existing residential patterns of these 
groups (Appendix Table A3). However, other characteristics such as the presence of Scheduled 
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Castes or the education levels of mothers are very similar across districts that ever had a close 
election and those that never did.15 It is also important to note that our main outcome, namely the 
gender ratio at birth, is very similar across these two types of areas. Areas that experienced close 
elections have higher fertility rates, consistent with their higher presence of Muslims and the 
documented Muslim preference for larger families.  
The occurrence of close inter-religious elections is not geographically concentrated: all 
states in our sample and nearly half of all the districts in our sample (167 out of 347) experience 
at least one such (close) election over our sample period. Close elections occur across a wide range 
of voter preferences towards Muslims. This is seen in Figure 2B where we plot the margin of 
victory between the Muslim and Non-Muslim candidate (when they are the top two vote-getters) 
against the share of votes obtained by Muslim candidates, a proxy for voter preferences using 
electoral constituency data. Among constituencies where the vote margin was 3 percentage points 
or less (i.e. close), the vote share of Muslim candidates varies considerably, from 16.5% to 51.1%. 
The treatment effect (effect of Muslim winning) may thus be regarded as representative of a range 
of political circumstances.  
To account for potential selection into close elections, we control for the fraction of 
constituencies in the district that were contested in close elections between Muslim and non-
Muslim candidates in both the first and second stage. Our IV estimates thus compare outcomes in 
districts where Muslims won close elections to those where they lost close elections, controlling 
for the potentially non-random occurrence of such elections. This also controls for any direct 
 
15 The Scheduled Castes are communities that have historically been at the bottom of the Hindu caste hierarchy. 
Scheduled Tribes include communities traditionally outside the Hindu caste system. Other Backward Castes refer to 
castes that are in the middle of the caste hierarchy. 
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effects of having close elections between the religions, such as greater political mobilization by 
parties or greater issue salience generated by the “excitement” of a close contest.  
 
5. Politician Religion and Birth Outcomes 
5.1. Sex ratio at birth  
We first discuss estimates of equation (1) when the dependent variable is the probability 
that a birth is a girl, on a sample of all births. On average, we find no significant impact of legislator 
religion on this variable (Table 2, column 1).  However, when we break out the effects by birth 
order, we see that there is a significantly higher probability of girl births at birth orders two and 
above in districts with a higher fraction of Muslim legislators (column 2). In fact, this is driven by 
birth orders three and above, where the coefficient is significant at the 1% level of significance 
(column 3). Since districts on average have about 10 electoral constituencies (the mean is 9.95), 
one additional Muslim legislator in the district increases the fraction of Muslim legislators by 
approximately 10 percentage points, which increases the probability of a girl birth at birth order 
three or higher by 0.702 percentage points. This corresponds to 85% of the deficit in the sex ratio 
of third births attributable to sex-selection.16 In 1995, arbitrarily selected as being in the middle of 
our sample, there were 26.3 million births in India and 45.4% of these were third order or higher. 
Our estimates imply that if Muslim representation increased from the current district average of 
5.6% to the population share of 13% (see district-level summary statistics in Appendix Table A2), 
this would increase third-order girl births by approximately 47,300. Thus, the impact is sizeable, 
considering that Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) estimate a total of 0.48 million sex-selective 
abortions per year in 1995-2005.  
 
16 This estimate is drawn from Bhalotra, Cochrane and Tam (2021) and is obtained by differencing with respect to 
first births, differencing between pre vs post ultrasound cohorts and averaging over the period 1970 to 2015.    
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Figure 6 shows the reduced form effects, regressing district-averaged gender ratios against 
Muslim vote share at the constituency level and displaying results by birth order. We plot 
regression discontinuity graphs fitting a nonparametric function (lowess) on both sides of the 
discontinuity. These plots confirm the patterns in Table 2, showing an increase in the fraction of 
births that is most evident from birth order 3, and absolutely not present at first birth. 
Table 2 also displays the main effect of Muslim legislators which, in columns 2 onward, is 
the coefficient for the firstborn child. The coefficients for higher order births, which are of opposite 
sign, pick up the impact of sex-selective abortion (girl foeticide) net of any overall improvements 
in foetal health effected by Muslim legislators. As discussed earlier, previous research indicates 
that the sex of first births is not manipulated. The first birth attracts a negative, although 
insignificant coefficient, which is consistent with previous evidence that Muslim legislators are 
better at delivering maternal and child health services (Bhalotra et al., 2014). In view of the greater 
innate vulnerability of the male foetus (Low, 2001; Waldron, 1983), this will favor survival of 
male births. In columns (4) and (5) we show results separately for the second and fourth rounds of 
the NFHS. The effect is larger for NFHS2 but remains positive and significant using NFHS4. 
While there is some overlap of birth cohorts between the two waves (Appendix Figure A2), the 
comparison across waves captures changes over time that are broadly consistent with declines in 
desired family size and in son preference over time (Appendix Figure A1).  
5.2. Robustness checks 
So as to analyze sensitivity of our results to mother characteristics which might be 
correlated with the outcome and influence compliance, we drop mother’s height and age at 
marriage (Table 2, column 6), and then all mother characteristics including education (Table 2, 
column 7), and the coefficients remain significant and of similar size. We subjected the main 
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results on the relative chances of a girl birth to a suite of robustness checks, using the specification 
in Table 2, column 3. We tested robustness to controlling for state*cohort fixed effects that include 
all state-level legislative changes, district-specific linear trends that capture trends in public health 
including availability of contraceptives, and to the inclusion of the Muslim-majority state of 
Jammu and Kashmir in the sample (Table 3, columns 1-3). The coefficient of interest remains 
statistically significant and is slightly larger than in our base specification.  
Restricting the sample to districts that had at least one close inter-religious election over 
our sample period (which generates most of the instrumental variation in our data) decreases the 
coefficient, but it is still significant at the 10% level (column 4). We then restrict to district-years 
(rather than districts) that experienced a close election, and control for linear margins rather than 
quadratic polynomials (column 5). This corresponds to the local linear specifications in the RDD 
literature (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). The size of the coefficient remains similar to our baseline 
coefficient, but we lose statistical significance because of the large decrease in the number of 
observations. In Appendix Table A6, we provide further robustness checks to assess sensitivity to 
controlling for polynomials of the margins of victory (column 2) and political party (column 3), 
and we also report OLS regressions (column 4). 
We checked sensitivity to the definition of close elections, replacing the 3% vote margin 
with a series of alternative vote margins ranging from 1% to 4.5%.  The coefficients are very 
similar, and remain in a narrow range between 0.05 and 0.1 (Figure 7A). We conducted a placebo 
test that examines whether the religious identity of future legislators elected in years (t + 4) or later 
affects the birth sex ratios in year t. Since ML(t-1) is the explanatory variable in the original 
specification, ML(t+4) is five years later and therefore reflects legislator identity in the next electoral 
term (state legislators in India have five-year terms), which should not affect past outcomes. We 
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find it does not (Figure 7B).17 Finally, we verify that the coefficients are not sensitive to dropping 
any specific state from our analysis (Figure 7C).  
5.3. Fertility  
As discussed earlier, continued fertility may be an alternative to sex-selective abortion in 
achieving a desired gender mix of children. We examined the probability of a (live) birth, keeping 
in mind that this reflects a combination of the decision to conceive and the decision not to terminate 
the pregnancy (for sex selection or other reasons). In districts with a higher fraction of Muslim 
legislators, we find a significantly higher probability of a birth at birth orders 2 and greater (Table 
4, column 2), which is driven by birth orders 3 and above (column 3). We estimate that one 
additional Muslim legislator (instead of a non-Muslim legislator) leads to a 1.04 percentage point 
increase in the probability of a birth at order three, which is (statistically) similar to the 0.702 
percentage point increase in the probability of a girl birth at order three that we reported in Table 
2, column 3. This makes it plausible that increased fertility at order three under Muslim leaders is 
a mechanical reflection of reduced abortion of the girl foetus. As with the sex ratio regressions in 
Table 2, we find a smaller effect on fertility for NFHS2 compared to NFHS4 (columns 4 and 5). 
We may additionally expect that families that do not conduct sex selection at order three 
but that nevertheless desire more sons, will continue fertility.18 Consistent with this, we find that 
in districts with Muslim legislators there is an increased probability of fourth and higher order 
births, also of about 1.02 percentage point (Table 5, column 1). The magnitude of this effect on 
fertility is broadly in in the same ballpark (slightly smaller) as impacts of papal influence or 
political sentiment in Bassi and Rasul (2017) and Dahl et al. (2021). Similar to Table 4, the results 
 
17 More than 70% of Muslim legislators who win in close elections are replaced by non-Muslims in the next election. 
18 Evidence in Anukriti et al (2021) implies that fertility motivated by the hope for a son widens the gap between 
desired and actual fertility. 
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in this table are stronger in NFHS2 than in NFHS4 (columns 2 and 3), and remain significant with 
or without the inclusion of controls for mother characteristics (column 4 and 5).  
5.4.  Infant mortality of girls relative to boys  
We took the sample of children who died within one month (neonatal mortality) and one 
year (infant mortality) of birth and defined the dependent variable as one if the death was of a girl, 
and zero if it was of a boy. Table 6 shows that under Muslim legislators, girls at third and higher 
order parity are significantly more represented among those who died, the difference being 1.85 
percentage points for neonatal deaths and 1.44 percentage points for infant deaths (columns 1 and 
2). This suggests a substitution of postnatal for prenatal death of girls relative to boys, 
demonstrated in the reverse direction- operating over time- in Anukriti et al. (2021), and this 
corroborates the earlier evidence against legislator religion influencing the sex ratio at birth by 
changing son preferences.19 While almost no substitution is observed in NFHS-2, coefficients are 
larger in NFHS-4, consistent with the larger pressured exerted by the reduction in fertility 
preferences (Table 6, columns 3-6).  
5.5. Direct measures of citizen gender preferences 
Two further pieces of evidence find no support for Muslim legislators changing families’ 
gender preferences. Using self-reported data on the ideal share of sons as the dependent variable, 
we test whether this is influenced by legislator religion and find no evidence that this is the case 
(Table A8, column 1).20 We then test whether families who want to commit sex selective abortion 
 
19 Note that here we model the gender difference in early childhood deaths under Muslims, and not the probability of 
childhood death. We did investigate this and we find no significant differences in neonatal or infant mortality at third 
and higher parity by legislator religion though, pooling across parities, we find reduced mortality rates under Muslim 
legislators, a result that we discuss in Bhalotra et al. (2014). 
20 There is no time variation in this variable in the NFHS so we make the bold and untestable assumption that this 
variable is meaningful for those women who report it close to the start of their reproductive careers, which we 
approximate as age 20. Since we have women of different birth cohorts interviewed in two waves we are able to 
generate time variation to match with variation in legislator identity. This analysis is crude and we do not lean on it. 
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but are hampered in doing this under a Muslim legislator delay pregnancy till their election term 
has passed and then enact their preferences if the Muslim is replaced by a non-Muslim. We find 
some evidence of this (Table A8, columns 2-5), where we show the results of regressing girl birth 
in future periods (t+3, t+4, t+6, t+10) on ML(t-1). Given the five-year term of legislators, periods 
(t+4) onward are likely to not have a Muslim legislator, since more than 70% of close-election 
Muslim winners are succeeded by non-Muslim winners.21 We find what appears to be a 
compensating increase in sex selective abortion soon after the legislator’s term ends that does not 
persist through to the end of the next election term. These results reinforce the findings so far in 
suggesting that there is no change in son preference under Muslim vs non-Muslim legislators. 
5.6. Heterogeneous effects  
Overall, these results are indicative of family behavior under Muslim legislators remaining 
son-seeking, albeit using fertility and postnatal girl mortality instead of sex selective abortion to 
achieve the goal. To further investigate it, we separated families into those with first-born girls vs 
first-born boys, relying upon carefully documented evidence in Anukriti et al. (2021) that the sex 
of the first born child is randomly assigned across families. There is also clear evidence that 
families that lack a boy child are more likely to conduct sex selection (Figure 1, panels C and D).  
We find that the impact of Muslim legislators on sex selection is higher among families 
where the first child is a girl compared to those where the first child is a boy (Table 7, columns 1 
and 2). Consistent with the increase in fertility under Muslim legislators being son-biased, we find 
larger fertility increases and larger increases in excess girl mortality in first-girl families (columns 
3-8). The coefficients are not (statistically) significantly different in these smaller data samples, 
 
21 It is relevant to add that of all seats lost by Muslims in close elections, 75% are subsequently won by non-Muslims. 
The similarity is exactly what we would expect if outcomes of close elections are quasi-random. 
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but they are different by an order of magnitude. The fact that results for the three outcomes line up 
as being concentrated among families that have been shown to be driving sex-selective abortion 
allows us to trace them all to the practice of abortion. 
We report results for other heterogeneity tests on the main outcome in Table A5. We 
investigate whether the effects of Muslim legislators on sex selective abortions vary by the religion 
of the mother. We find that the effect is concentrated among Hindu and Sikh families (columns 1 
and 2), who have been shown to be more likely than Muslim families to commit sex selection, 
whether among Asian immigrants in Canada (Almond et al., 2013) or among Indians (Bhalotra 
and Cochrane, 2010).  We similarly find that the effects are concentrated in states with more male-
biased population gender ratios in 1981 (columns 5 and 6), and we find no significant differences 
in the impact of legislator religion on the birth sex ratio by mother’s age (columns 3 and 4). 
5.7. Violence against women 
The results for fertility and childhood mortality undermine changes in fertility-related sex 
preferences as a channel but since sex-selective abortion also harms the health of women, we 
investigated whether Muslim legislators exhibit pro-female policies in general. We do this by 
investigating the effects of Muslim legislators on violence against women. Female foeticide is a 
form of violence against women, making this also a cognate outcome. 
We first use self-reported domestic violence, recorded in the NFHS, which takes great care 
to ask questions in a confidential setting to encourage reporting.22 We find no significant impact 
of legislator religion on the fraction of women who report being beaten over the past 12 months, 
at either the extensive or intensive margins (Appendix Table A7, panel A, columns 1 and 2). We 
 
22 Since these questions were asked only for the time of the survey, there is no time variation in the data. We therefore 
run a regression that includes state*year of interview fixed effects (the survey was conducted over 1998, 1999, 2015 
and 2016), and instrument the fraction of Muslim legislators in the district with the fraction of Muslim legislators who 
won in close elections with a vote margin of less than 3%. 
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also find no change in attitudes towards domestic violence, measured as the fraction of female 
respondents who agree that it is acceptable for a husband to beat his wife for any reason (columns 
3 and 4).23  
We then used administrative records of gender-based crimes reported to the police as 
previous research has shown that policymakers can influence the reporting and handling of crime 
against women (Iyer et al., 2012; Amaral et al., 2021). We obtained data for 1980-2008 from the 
National Crime Records Bureau, and ran an instrumental variables regression, similar to equation 
(1), controlling for district and year fixed effects. The dependent variables are the logarithms of 
per capita reports of rape, kidnapping of women and girls, sexual assault, sexual harassment, 
domestic violence and dowry deaths. We find no significant effect of legislator religion on any of 
these crimes against women (Appendix Table A7, panel B).24 We recognize that it is possible for 
an increase in reporting of crimes to be counterbalanced by an increase in deterrence, but we 
nevertheless did these tests on self-reported and police-reported violence because it is of 
independent interest to consider broadly related outcomes, as this can illuminate the motives and 
mechanisms underlying our main result.  
5.8. Comparison with female legislators 
It is natural to ask whether female legislators act to limit female foeticide and to expect that 
this too will illuminate political preference or identity-based influences on this outcome. Existing 
evidence suggests that the presence of women leaders changes policy outcomes towards those 
preferred by women (Baskaran et al., 2020; Iyer et al., 2012). We therefore model the three birth-
 
23 We examine two reasons that are consistently enumerated across both survey waves, namely whether the husband 
is justified in beating his wife if he suspects her of being unfaithful or if she shows disrespect for her in-laws. 
24 The last four categories are reported only in years 1995 and later; kidnapping of women and girls is reported for 
years 1985 and later. We see no impact of Muslim legislators on crimes against women even in the longer sample 
period of 1980-2008 for which we have crime data. 
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related outcomes again, but now comparing female with male legislators rather than Muslim with 
non-Muslim legislators. Identification proceeds in a similar manner, using a close elections 
strategy and differencing by birth order, but now using a sample of elections in which the top two 
contestants are a man and a woman as, for instance, in Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras (2014).  
Having female as opposed to male legislators in a district has no significant impact on the 
sex ratio of either births or infant deaths but it leads to significantly lower fertility (Table 8). These 
present a stark contrast to the impact of Muslim legislators, which is to increase the share of girls 
at birth, increase the share of girls among infant deaths and to increase fertility.  The results for 
women are consistent with (a) the fact that women in the NFHS survey report a high degree of son 
preference, and (b) women usually wanting fewer children than men (Ashraf et al., 2014). The 
latter has also been documented by demographers using the World Fertility Surveys, and Bhalotra 
et al. (2020c) show that increasing the share of women parliamentarians (via gender quotas) leads 
to expansions in reproductive health coverage including contraceptive coverage, and to declines 
in fertility.  
 
6.  Discussion  
Our working hypothesis is that our results arise from stronger anti-abortion preferences 
among Muslims that are embodied in Muslim legislators. We are able to discriminate between 
preferences over abortion and preferences over sons using stated preference data and by 
demonstrating that fertility and girl-biased infant mortality increase in Muslim-won districts. Our 
results indicate that the operative mechanism is not a change in son preference. We consider now 
the channels through which the presence of Muslim legislators might have changed the practice of 
selective abortion. Legislators can exert their preferences by proposing or voting for legislation, 
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monitoring adherence to existing legislation and directing resources to specific causes. They can 
also exert influence through informal channels including deliberation, making issues they care 
about salient or providing information to citizens. Even if leaders do nothing, citizen reactions to 
leader identity can change individual behavior.  
State-level legislation is clearly not the primary mechanism here as there was a federal ban 
on prenatal sex detection in 1996, the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques 
(PC&PNDT) Act, preceded only by similar legislation being passed in the state of Maharashtra in 
1988. In any case, we showed that our estimates are not sensitive to controlling for state-year fixed 
effects (Table 2), which would absorb changes in state level laws. State legislators can influence 
implementation of federal or state laws or programs in their electoral districts (Gupta and 
Mukhopadhyay, 2016; Baskaran et al., 2015; Min, 2015; Asher and Novosad, 2017; Baskaran et 
al., 2021). Using data in a narrow window of two years on each side of the federal ban to limit the 
play of confounding events, we examined whether the impact of legislator religion on sex selective 
abortion is higher after its enactment in 1996. The coefficient for the post-reform period is 
significant and larger, although it is not statistically significantly different from the pre-reform 
coefficient (Appendix Table A5, columns 7 and 8). This is consistent with the federal law 
providing legislators with a tool with which to achieve lower abortion rates, though this need not 
be the only or the main channel of their influence. We could not identify systematic data on 
enforcement over time and across districts, nor on expenditures relevant to abortion reduction.  
Informal mechanisms of salience and information are difficult to measure but recent 
research analyzing the text of debates in parliaments and local government councils reveals that 
legislators bring their preferences to the table, for example, women are more likely than men to 
discuss issues that concern women including childcare and health (Baskaran and Hassami, 2019; 
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Lippmann, 2020; Bhalotra, Fernandez and Slapin, 2018). Political deliberation is often the first 
step towards legislation but even where legislation does not follow, it has been shown to influence 
public opinion (Chong and Druckman, 2007).25  
Our findings are broadly coherent with research that finds leader effects on fertility in 
circumstances where the leaders did nothing in the political space to influence it. Bassi and Rasul 
(2017) show that persuasive messages in the Pope’s speeches during a visit to Brazil led to 
reductions in contraceptive use of more than 40% and a 1.6% increase in fertility nine months 
later. Dahl et al. (2021) show that political sentiment led to higher fertility in Republican relative 
to Democratic districts following the election of Donald Trump, the differences being sizeable at 
1.1 to 2.6 percentage points. Using a lab in field experiment in India in which groups are assigned 
to either Muslim or Hindu leaders, Bhalotra et al. (2021) demonstrate that citizen behavior in a 
coordination game varies with leader identity, conditional upon leader actions. Beaman et al. 
(2009) show that quotas for women in local government lead to higher aspirations and increased 
educational attainment for girls. These studies suggest that leader identity can influence citizen 
behavior through the largely unobservable channels of inspiration, optimism or sentiment. Overall, 
other than the weak evidence we present to suggest that Muslim legislators may have strengthened 
enforcement of the federal ban on prenatal sex detection, it is difficult to find data to systematically 
document these more informal channels. 
  
7.  Conclusions 
We examined whether the religious preferences of elected representatives can shape the 
birth outcomes of the population, using a combination of two large-scale representative household 
 
25 We tried but were unable to obtain systematic records of state legislative assembly speeches in India. 
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survey datasets and a unique database identifying the religion of all candidates for election to 
India’s state legislative assemblies. We focused on sex-selective abortion as an outcome, because 
different religions have different preferences towards abortion, and sex-selective abortion is a 
phenomenon of growing proportions. Moreover, it is a phenomenon that appears not to have 
responded to policy-led prohibitions. Our results suggest that one reason for this is that India has 
predominantly Hindu legislators whose preferences are likely to be aligned with those of the 
majority Hindu population, who appear tolerant of sex-selective abortion. Using a quasi-
experimental approach, we show that Muslim legislators are more effective at controlling the 
selective abortion of girls. Our paper highlights that the personal identity of legislators is a key 
component of policy effectiveness.  
 In line with the idea that this mainly reflects the exercise of anti-abortion preferences, we 
find a rise in fertility under Muslim legislators, suggesting a substitution from sex-selective 
abortion to greater fertility as a means of achieving the desired gender mix of children. We also 
find evidence consistent with an adjustment in parental investments in children, marked by girls 
being more likely than boys to die in infancy at higher parities. This clarifies that there was no 
change in the underlying preference for sons, just a change in abortion practices. Our estimates 
imply that reducing barriers to Muslim representation in political office may help to counteract the 
rising trend of sex-selective abortion in India, albeit with concomitant increases in fertility and 
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Table 1
Abortion and Son Preferences by Religion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mother's 



















Muslim -0.0720** -0.125*** -0.0882** -0.0551 0.290*** 0.205*** 0.00275**
(0.0319) (0.0433) (0.0426) (0.0431) (0.0139) (0.00878) (0.00111)
Dep var Mean for Non-Muslims 0.908 0.688 0.723 0.613 1.275 0.979 0.562
N 2344 2344 2344 2344 317185 317185 283528
R-squared 0.013 0.011 0.008 0.012 0.223 0.101 0.038
Agree that abortion is acceptable when NFHS Surveys
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data from World Values Survey for India in 1990 in columns 1-4; 6% of 
this sample is Muslim. Controls include gender, age, education categories, marital status of the respondent and family income categories. Data from 
NFHS-2 and NFHS-4 in colulmns 5-7. Controls include district fixed effects, mother's year-of-birth fixed effects, dummies for rural residence, 
Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Other Backward Caste, education levels of mother, categorical variables for mother height and age at marriage). 
Table 2
Legislator Religion and Sex-Selective Abortion
Dependent variable: Dummy for the birth of a girl child
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pooled birth 
order Order 2+
Order 2, 3+; 
Baseline 
specification
Order 2, 3+; 
NFHS 2
Order 2, 3+; 
NFHS 4
Drop mother 





Fraction Muslim legislators (ML) -0.0279 -0.0672 -0.0671 -0.347 -0.0219 -0.0663 -0.0615
(0.0750) (0.0770) (0.0769) (0.455) (0.0761) (0.0770) (0.0772)
ML*birth order>=2 0.0536**
(0.0241)
ML*birth order 2 0.0239 0.0913 0.0177 0.0240 0.0218
(0.0261) (0.108) (0.0270) (0.0260) (0.0261)
ML*birth order>=3 0.0702*** 0.191** 0.0574* 0.0699** 0.0636**
(0.0272) (0.0867) (0.0302) (0.0272) (0.0272)
-0.0103 -0.0106 -0.0110 -0.0113 -0.0162 -0.0109 -0.0110
(0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0412) (0.0194) (0.0171) (0.0170)
Birth order 2 0.00431*** 0.00100 0.00289 -0.00755 0.00380 0.00258 0.00310
(0.00161) (0.00214) (0.00226) (0.00819) (0.00236) (0.00226) (0.00226)
Birth order>=3 0.000453 -0.00293 -0.00401 -0.0141** -0.00408 -0.00477* -0.00180
(0.00199) (0.00237) (0.00252) (0.00716) (0.00280) (0.00248) (0.00234)
Observations 861010 861010 861010 145145 715865 861010 861010
Mean of dependent variable 0.475 0.475 0.475 0.480 0.474 0.475 0.475
Fraction of seats with close inter-
religious elections
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district level. Coefficients are from 2SLS regressions, controlling for district and child year-of-
birth fixed effects, quadratic polynomials in the vote margins, party identity of politicians and mother characteristics (mother's year-of-birth fixed effects, dummies for rural 
residence, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, Other Backward Caste, education levels of mother, categorical variables for mother height and age at marriage). 
Regressions exclude the state of Jammu & Kashmir. 
Table 3
Legislator Religion and Sex-Selective Abortion: Robustness Tests
Dependent variable: Dummy for the birth of a girl child (mean 0.475 and standard deviation 0.499).








Districts that ever 





Fraction Muslim legislators (ML) -0.0778 -0.0768 -0.0690 -0.0640 -0.0136
(0.0821) (0.0828) (0.0867) (0.0686) (0.505)
ML*birth order 2 0.0256 0.0254 0.0377 0.0182 0.126
(0.0259) (0.0260) (0.0277) (0.0389) (0.122)
ML*birth order>=3 0.0734*** 0.0740*** 0.0795*** 0.0534* 0.0747
(0.0271) (0.0270) (0.0272) (0.0312) (0.0904)
Fraction of seats with close -0.00456 -0.0208 -0.0157 -0.0130 -0.000494
inter-religious elections (0.0169) (0.0189) (0.0163) (0.0152) (0.0792)
Birth order 2 0.00280 0.00282 0.00138 0.00402 -0.0234
(0.00226) (0.00227) (0.00283) (0.00445) (0.0262)
Birth order>=3 -0.00397 -0.00431* -0.00619** -0.000207 -0.0113
(0.00251) (0.00252) (0.00303) (0.00399) (0.0205)
Observations 861010 861010 893699 474339 91558
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district level in all columns except 4 and 5, where they are 
clustered at the district-election level. Coefficients are from 2SLS regressions, controlling for district and year-of-birth fixed effects, 
quadratic polynomials in the vote margins (linear in column 6), party identity of politicians and mother characteristics (mother's year-of-
birth fixed effects, dummies for rural residence, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, Other Backward Caste, education levels of 
mother, categorical variables for mother height and age at marriage). Regressions exclude the state of Jammu & Kashmir except when 
specified. Close inter-religious elections defined as those with vote margin of 3 percentage points or less.
Table 4
Legislator Religion and Fertility
Dependent variable: Whether there is any birth in that year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pooled birth 
order Order 2+ Order 2, 3+
Order 2, 3+; 
NFHS 2
Order 2, 3+; 
NFHS 4
Drop mother 
height and age 
at marriage
Drop all mother 
characteristics
Fraction Muslim -0.0163 -0.0928 -0.0858 0.142 -0.0934 -0.0927 -0.153*
legislators (ML) (0.0587) (0.0597) (0.0597) (0.197) (0.0606) (0.0642) (0.0824)
ML*birth order>=2 0.103***
(0.0353)
ML*birth order 2 0.0476 0.0474 0.0561* 0.0592* 0.144***
(0.0325) (0.0799) (0.0315) (0.0320) (0.0525)
ML*birth order>=3 0.104*** 0.198*** 0.112*** 0.0990*** 0.179***
(0.0379) (0.0770) (0.0377) (0.0348) (0.0394)
Fraction of seats with close -0.0167 -0.0161 -0.0178 -0.0205 -0.0110 -0.0174 -0.0207
inter-religious elections (0.0179) (0.0176) (0.0173) (0.0290) (0.0186) (0.0183) (0.0190)
Observations 5162556 5162556 5162556 930695 4231861 5162556 5162803
Mean of dependent variable 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.154 0.166 0.164 0.164
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district level. Coefficients are from 2SLS regressions, controlling for district and 
child year-of-birth fixed effects, quadratic polynomials in the vote margins, party identity of politicians and mother characteristics (mother's year-of-birth fixed 
effects, dummies for rural residence, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, Other Backward Caste, education levels of mother, categorical variables for mother 
height and age at marriage) and time since last birth. Regressions exclude the state of Jammu & Kashmir.
Table 5
Legislator Religion and Fertility at Birth Order 4 and Higher
Dependent variable: Whether there is any birth in that year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Order 2, 3, 4+ Order 2, 3, 4+; 
NFHS2
Order 2, 3, 4+; 
NFHS4 Drop mother 





Fraction Muslim -0.0882 0.140 -0.0963 -0.0959 -0.161*
legislators (ML) (0.0600) (0.195) (0.0608) (0.0646) (0.0835)
ML*birth order 2 0.0476 0.0453 0.0563* 0.0596* 0.146***
(0.0324) (0.0793) (0.0313) (0.0318) (0.0523)
ML*birth order 3 0.119*** 0.154* 0.135*** 0.121*** 0.206***
(0.0408) (0.0837) (0.0412) (0.0376) (0.0440)
ML*birth order>=4 0.102*** 0.209*** 0.108*** 0.0988*** 0.189***
(0.0381) (0.0763) (0.0375) (0.0352) (0.0407)
Fraction of seats with close -0.0175 -0.0198 -0.0110 -0.0172 -0.0197
inter-religious elections (0.0173) (0.0286) (0.0186) (0.0182) (0.0191)
Observations 5162556 930695 4231861 5162556 5162803
Mean of dependent variable 0.164 0.154 0.166 0.164 0.164
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district level. Coefficients are from 2SLS regressions, 
controlling for district and child year-of-birth fixed effects, quadratic polynomials in the vote margins, party identity of politicians and 
mother characteristics (mother's year-of-birth fixed effects, dummies for rural residence, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, 
Other Backward Caste, education levels of mother, categorical variables for mother height and age at marriage) and time since last birth. 
Regressions exclude the state of Jammu & Kashmir.
Table 6
Legislator Identity and Gender of Childhood Mortality 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable -->
Infant death 
was a girl 
child
Neonatal 
death was a 
girl child
Infant death 
was a girl 
child
Neonatal 








Fraction Muslim -0.0787 0.150 1.400 0.703 -0.167 0.0693
legislators (ML) (0.318) (0.476) (2.216) (1.484) (0.325) (0.488)
ML*birth order 2 -0.00210 0.154 0.0457 0.161 -0.00943 0.145
(0.0972) (0.123) (0.379) (0.431) (0.104) (0.128)
ML*birth order>=3 0.144* 0.185* 0.0849 0.00492 0.155* 0.187*
(0.0823) (0.106) (0.283) (0.327) (0.0823) (0.107)
Fraction of seats with close -0.0435 -0.0343 -0.0448 -0.0104 -0.0456 -0.0543
inter-religious elections (0.0620) (0.0706) (0.181) (0.165) (0.0702) (0.0776)
Birth order 2 0.0405*** 0.0204** 0.0285 0.00391 0.0422*** 0.0246**
(0.00836) (0.0103) (0.0255) (0.0312) (0.00929) (0.0111)
Birth order>=3 0.0592*** 0.0458*** 0.0620*** 0.0407 0.0563*** 0.0482***
(0.00844) (0.0105) (0.0232) (0.0277) (0.00882) (0.0111)
Observations 53675 36796 11868 7700 41807 29096
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district level. Coefficients are from 2SLS regressions, 
controlling for district and child year-of-birth fixed effects, quadratic polynomials in the vote margins, party identity of politicians and mother 
characteristics (mother's year-of-birth fixed effects, dummies for rural residence, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, Other Backward 




Differential Effects of Legislator Identity by Gender of First Birth

















ML*birth order 2 -0.131 0.155 -0.0525 -0.117** 0.127 -0.149 0.948 0.504
(0.134) (0.124) (0.0666) (0.0580) (0.535) (0.490) (0.744) (0.723)
ML*birth order>=3 0.0559 0.0324 0.0770** 0.0361 0.214 0.0324 0.108 -0.118
(0.0342) (0.0466) (0.0316) (0.0280) (0.181) (0.112) (0.223) (0.134)
Fraction of seats with close 0.00895 -0.00458 -0.0186 -0.0168 0.0490 -0.0738 0.0655 -0.0420
inter-religious elections (0.0292) (0.0254) (0.0149) (0.0178) (0.104) (0.0827) (0.148) (0.109)
Observations 315744 303099 1880595 2301348 13156 25696 8705 16937
Girl birth Any birth Infant death was a girl Neonatal death was a 
ML refers to fraction Muslim legislators in the district. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district level. 
Coefficients are from 2SLS regressions, controlling for district and child year-of-birth fixed effects, quadratic polynomials in the vote margins, party identity 
of politicians and mother characteristics (mother's year-of-birth fixed effects, dummies for rural residence, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, Other 
Backward Caste, education levels of mother, categorical variables for mother height and age at marriage). Regressions exclude the state of Jammu & Kashmir. 
Columns 3-4 control for time since last birth.
Table 8
Women Legislators and Birth Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable --> Girl birth Any birth
Infant death 
was a girl 
child
Neonatal 
death was a 
girl child
Fraction women legislators (WL) 0.0396 0.0737 -0.0397 0.686
(0.126) (0.0973) (0.529) (0.695)
WL*birth order 2 0.0665 -0.125*** -0.0732 -0.0584
(0.0439) (0.0436) (0.195) (0.266)
WL*birth order>=3 0.0225 -0.189*** 0.0912 0.111
(0.0496) (0.0478) (0.192) (0.235)
Fraction seats with  0.000939 -0.000605 -0.0375 0.0280
close mixed-gender elections (0.0159) (0.0114) (0.0691) (0.0934)
Birth order 2 0.000457 0.0280*** 0.0445*** 0.0332**
(0.00307) (0.00380) (0.0130) (0.0167)
Birth order>=3 -0.000807 -0.0629*** 0.0633*** 0.0506***
(0.00344) (0.00469) (0.0127) (0.0154)
Observations 861010 5162556 53675 36796
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district level. Coefficients are from 
2SLS regressions, controlling for district and child year-of-birth fixed effects, quadratic polynomials in the vote 
margins, party identity of politicians and mother characteristics (mother's year-of-birth fixed effects, dummies for 
rural residence, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, Other Backward Caste, education levels of mother, 
categorical variables for mother height and age at marriage). Regressions exclude the state of Jammu & Kashmir. 
Column 2 includes a control for time since last birth. 
Figure 1
Sex Ratio Trends in India (Fraction of Females)
A: Total and 0-6 Years (Census Data) B. Fraction females at birth
C. Second births D. Third and higher order births
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Figure 2
Instrumental Variables Strategy Based on Close Elections
A. "First Stage" of Instrumental Variables Strategy B. Muslim Candidate Vote Share across Different Vote Margins
Notes to Figure A: The x-axis shows the constituency-level victory margin between Muslims and non-Muslims, defined as the vote share of Muslim candidate(s) minus 
vote share of non-Muslim candidate(s) so that a positive margin is associated with a Muslim winning a legislative assembly seat. The y-axis shows the district-level 
fraction of Muslim legislators.
Notes to Figure B: Figure uses constituency-level data on the overall vote share obtained by the Muslim candidate (x-axis) and the margin of victory between a Muslim 
and non-Muslim candidate (y-axis). Figure is for constituencies that had inter-religious elections i.e. a Muslim and non-Muslim candidate as the top two votegetters. 
The Muslim candidate wins when the vote margin is greater than zero, and loses when the vote margin is less than zero.
Figure 3
Continuity of the Vote Margin between Muslims and non-Muslims
A. Density of the victory margin B. Testing for density discontinuities at zero (McCrary test)
Notes: Sample restricted to elections where a Muslim and a non-Muslim were the top two vote-getters.
Discontinuity estimate in Figure B (log difference in height): -0.0038 (standard error = 0.0919)
Figure 4: Continuity in Demographic Characteristics
A. Fraction urban population B. Fraction SC/ST population C. Fraction female
D. Fraction literate E. Fraction Muslims
Figure 5:  Continuity in Political Characteristics 
A: Total votes cast B: Number of candidates C: Fraction of Muslim candidates
D: Fraction female candidates E: Winner is from Congress F: Winner is from BJP
G: Winner is from BSP H: Winner is from a Communist party I: Winner is an incumbent
Figure 6
Illustration of the Reduced Form regression
A. Birth order 1 B. Birth order 2 and higher C. Birth order 3 and higher
The x-axis shows the constituency-level victory margin between Muslims and non-Muslims, defined as the vote share of Muslim candidate(s) minus vote share of 
non-Muslim candidate(s) so that a positive margin is associated with a Muslim winning a legislative assembly seat. The y-axis shows the district-level fraction 
births that are female at different birth parities.
Figure 7: Robustness of Sex-Selection Coefficients
A. Alternative vote margins for close elections B. Effect of Muslim representation in the future
C. Robustness to dropping one state at a time
Each point in the figures represents the coefficient on Muslim Legislator (ML) * 
birth order>=3 from a 2SLS regression. 95% confidence intervals for the 
coefficients are also displayed. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 
one if the child born is a girl. Coefficients are estimated using the specification 
of Table 2, column 3. In Panel A, we use different vote margins used to define 
close inter-religious elections. "P10" shows the coefficient when a vote margin 
of 1.0% is used to define close elections, "P15" uses 1.5% as the vote margin 
for close elections etc. In Panel B, ML (t+4) indicates that the explanatory 
variable is ML 4 years after the birth of the child, ML (t+5) indicates ML 5 
years after birth of the child and so on. Each legislator's term lasts for 5 years. In 
Panel C, we estimate coefficients dropping one state at a time. Labels "AP", 
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Appendix Tables and Figures
Table A1
Preferences about Gender Roles across Religions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Husband and wife 
should both 
contribute to  
household income.
University 
education is more 






Men make better 
executives than 
women do.
Muslim -0.0550*** -0.00461 -0.0263 0.0489
(0.0203) (0.0227) (0.0235) (0.0429)
Dep var Mean for Non-Muslims 0.8079 0.3936 0.5690 0.6079
N 5411 4435 4344 1255
R-squared 0.019 0.070 0.055 0.037
World Values Surveys : Agreement with statements
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data for column 1 is from World Values Surveys of 1990, 1995, 2001; data for columns 2 
and 3 is from the 1995, 2001 and 2006 waves and for column 4 is from 2006. Dependent variables are binary and were obtained 
by transforming variables initially coded as integer on [1,4]. Controls include gender, age, educational category, marital status 
and family income category of the respondent, and dummies for year of survey. 
Table A2
Panel A: Birth Outcomes and Demographics
#obs Mean #obs Mean #obs Mean
Dummy for girl birth 861,010 0.475 145145 0.480 715865 0.474
    At birth order 1 242,167 0.473 32017 0.480 210150 0.472
    At birth order 2 253,398 0.477 36566 0.479 216832 0.477
    At birth order 3 or higher 365,445 0.476 76562 0.481 288883 0.475
Dummy for any birth 5,162,803 0.164 930942 0.154 4231861 0.166
Infant mortality (dummy for child dying in first year of life), girls 409,331 0.061 69718 0.083 339613 0.057
Infant mortality (dummy for child dying in first year of life), boys 451,679 0.064 75427 0.081 376252 0.060
Neonatal mortality (dummy for child dying in first month of life), girls 409,331 0.039 69718 0.050 339613 0.037
Neonatal mortality (dummy for child dying in first month of life), boys 451,679 0.046 75427 0.056 376252 0.044
Rural resident 861,010 0.794 145145 0.771 715865 0.798
Muslim 861,010 0.135 145145 0.137 715865 0.135
Scheduled caste 861,010 0.212 145145 0.199 715865 0.215
Scheduled tribe 861,010 0.125 145145 0.100 715865 0.130
Other backward caste 861,010 0.422 145145 0.322 715865 0.442
Fraction mothers with no education 861,010 0.569 145145 0.639 715865 0.555
Fraction mothers with primary education 861,010 0.154 145145 0.158 715865 0.154
Fraction mothers with secondary education 861,010 0.244 145145 0.160 715865 0.261
Fraction mothers with higher education 861,010 0.033 145145 0.043 715865 0.031
Panel B: Electoral Variables. District-year Level
#obs Mean #obs Mean #obs Mean
Fraction of seats won by Muslim legislators (ML) 11,047 0.056 7,232 0.056 3,815 0.057
Fraction of seats won by Muslims in close inter-religious elections 11,047 0.008 7,232 0.006 3,815 0.011
Fraction of seats  with close inter-religious elections 11,047 0.016 7,232 0.015 3,815 0.019
Any Muslim legislator (dummy) 11,047 0.335 7,232 0.337 3,815 0.331
Any close inter-religious elections (dummy) 11,047 0.143 7,232 0.133 3,815 0.163
Any Muslim legislator who won a close inter-religious election (dummy) 11,047 0.073 7,232 0.063 3,815 0.091




Districts with no 
close elections
Districts with at 
least one close 
election Difference
Mother characteristics
Muslim 0.058 0.163 0.105 ***
Scheduled Caste 0.202 0.201 -0.001
Scheduled Tribe 0.162 0.083 -0.079 ***
Other Backward Caste 0.389 0.442 0.053 ***
Rural 0.782 0.749 -0.034 ***
No education 0.461 0.486 0.026 ***
Primary education 0.165 0.153 -0.012 ***
Secondary education 0.324 0.304 -0.020 ***
Higher education 0.051 0.057 0.006 ***
Age at interview 35.9 35.8 -0.106 ***
N 150,051 171,873
Outcome variables
Girl child born 0.475 0.476 0.001
N 385,172 475,838
Any birth in a given year 0.157 0.170 0.013 ***
N 2,409,999 2,752,804
Comparing Mother Characteristics and Birth Outcomes Across Districts with and without 
Close Inter-Religious Elections
*** indicates that the difference is statistically significant at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level and * 
indicates significance at 10% level.
Table A4
Instrumental Variables Strategy: First Stage
Dependent variable: Fraction Muslim legislators in the district









0.398*** 0.362*** 0.441*** 0.362***
(0.094) (0.088) (0.091) (0.089)
Fraction of seats with close inter-religious elections -0.0780* -0.104*** -0.108** -0.103***
(0.047) (0.039) (0.045) (0.038)
Observations 861,009 11,047 5,162,556 11,058
R-squared 0.932 0.913 0.937 0.914
F-statistic 983.2 410.0 533.2 371.7
Margin of victory for close elections 3% 3% 3% 3%
Fraction of seats with Muslim legislators who won 
close elections against non-Muslims
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district level. All regressions control for district and child's year-of-
birth fixed effects, quadratic polynomials in the vote margins,  party identity of politicians and mother characteristics (mother's year-of-birth fixed 
effects, dummies for rural residence, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, Other Backward Caste, education levels of mother, categorical 
variables for mother height and age at marriage). Regressions exclude the state of Jammu & Kashmir.
Girl birth sample Birth sample
Table A5
Differential Effects of Legislator Identity by Religion, Age, Region and Legal Regime
Dependent variable: dummy for the birth of a girl child

















Act Not in 
Force
Fraction Muslim -0.0115 -0.266* -0.0966 -0.0637 -0.180* 0.160 0.00415 -2.373***
legislators (ML) (0.0908) (0.138) (0.0908) (0.157) (0.109) (0.128) (0.619) (0.699)
ML*birth order 2 -0.000235 0.114* 0.0243 0.0329 0.0294 0.0148 0.0916 0.0447
(0.0343) (0.0677) (0.0310) (0.0412) (0.0299) (0.0517) (0.104) (0.239)
ML*birth order>=3 0.0819** 0.0337 0.0774*** 0.0891** 0.0969*** 0.0238 0.204** 0.161
(0.0376) (0.0625) (0.0284) (0.0433) (0.0304) (0.0501) (0.0930) (0.157)
Observations 691475 111835 341046 519964 547699 313311 114932 64969
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district level. Coefficients are from 2SLS regressions, controlling for district and child year-of-
birth fixed effects, quadratic polynomials in the vote margins, party identity of politicians and mother characteristics (mother's year-of-birth fixed effects, dummies for rural 
residence, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, Other Backward Caste, education levels of mother, categorical variables for mother height and age at marriage). Younger 
women defined as those born in 1978 (median of mother's birth year) or later. PC &PNDT Act refers to the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques Act, which 
came into force in Maharashtra in 1988, and nationwide in 1996. Sample in column 7 is restricted to births two years prior to the reform; sample in column 8 is restricted to 
births two years after the reform.
Table A6
Legislator Identity and Sex-Selective Abortion: Additional Robustness Tests
Dependent variable: Dummy for the birth of a girl child (mean = 0.475)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline specification 








Fraction Muslim legislators (ML) -0.0671 -0.00823 -0.0128 -0.0423**
(0.0769) (0.0384) (0.0368) (0.0197)
ML*birth order 2 0.0239 0.0236 0.0234 0.0114
(0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0147)
ML*birth order>=3 0.0702*** 0.0674** 0.0669** 0.0455***
(0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0273) (0.0157)
-0.0110 -0.00639 -0.00716 -0.0115
(0.0170) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0163)
Observations 861010 861010 861010 861010
Fraction of seats with close inter-
religious elections
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district level. Coefficients are from 2SLS 
regressions (except when specified otherwise), controlling for district and child year-of-birth fixed effects, quadratic polynomials in 
the vote margins, party identity of politicians and mother characteristics (mother's year-of-birth fixed effects, dummies for rural 
residence, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, Other Backward Caste, education levels of mother, categorical variables for 
mother height and age at marriage). Regressions exclude the state of Jammu & Kashmir. 
Table A7
Legislator Religion and Violence Against Women
Panel A: Domestic Violence - Incidence and Attitudes (Self-Reported)








Fraction Muslim 0.217 0.0650 -0.431 -0.224
legislators (ML) (0.388) (0.231) (0.603) (0.450)
Observations 43521 43521 97897 97897
Mean of dependent variable 0.670 0.066 0.425 0.196
Panel B: Crimes Against Women (Police Reports)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rape
Kidnapping of 





Fraction Muslim 0.229 -0.104 -0.477 -1.305 -0.842 -0.373
legislators (ML) (0.474) (0.392) (0.625) (0.944) (0.890) (0.577)
Observations 8985 6494 4376 3283 4337 4046
Standard errors in parantheses, clustered at district level. Data are from NFHS2 and NFHS-4 women respondents. The coefficients are from 2SLS regressions, 
controlling for party identity of legislators, fraction of close inter-religious elections in the district, quadratic polynomials in the victory margin, individual 
demographics and state*year of interview fixed effects. Dependent variables are dummy variables defined as follows:  (1) equal to one if respondent reports not 
being beaten or experiencing physical violence in the last 12 months; (2) equals one if respondent reports being beaten or experiencing physical violence "many 
times" in the last 12 months; (3) equals one if the respondent agrees that it is acceptable for a husband to beat his wife for any one of the following reasons: if he 
suspects her of being unfaithful or if she shows disrespect; (4) equals one if the respondent agrees that it is acceptable to beat the wife for both of these reasons. 
Standard errors in parantheses, clustered at district level. The coefficients are from 2SLS regressions, controlling for district and year fixed effects, district 
population and literacy rates, party identity of legislators, fraction of close inter-religious elections in the district and quadratic polynomials in the victory margin. 
Dependent variables are log(# of reported crimes per 100,000 women). Crime data obtained from National Crime Records Bureau for 1980-2008.
Table A8
Legislator Religion and Change in Gender Preferences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable --> Ideal share of 
boys
Girl birth (3+ 
years later)
Girl birth (4+ 
years later)
Girl birth (6+ 
years later)




Fraction Muslim legislators (ML) -0.0411 -0.249 -0.483 -0.282
(0.173) (0.240) (0.369) (0.394)
ML*birth order 2 -0.0120 -0.0152 -0.0408 -0.0125
(0.0203) (0.0212) (0.0270) (0.0313)
ML*birth order>=3 -0.0303 -0.0739** -0.0713* 0.0192
(0.0247) (0.0307) (0.0412) (0.0446)
Fraction seats with  0.00217 0.0321 0.0307 0.0240 0.0159
close mixed-gender elections (0.0396) (0.0255) (0.0285) (0.0355) (0.0433)
Observations 239214 736461 690923 599893 417308
Fraction Muslim legislators when 
mother was age 20 (ML20)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district level. Coefficients are from 2SLS regressions. Column 1 controls for 
age of respondent (and its square), education level, rural residence, caste identity, year of marriage categories and state fixed effects. Columns 2-5 control for 
district and child year-of-birth fixed effects, quadratic polynomials in the vote margins, party identity of politicians and mother characteristics (mother's year-
of-birth fixed effects, dummies for rural residence, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, Other Backward Caste, education levels of mother, categorical 
variables for mother height and age at marriage). 
Figure A1
Trends in Desired Fertility and Son Preference
A. Stated ideal family size B. Stated share of boys among desired children
Data from our regression sample based on NFHS2 and NFHS4. Lowest 1% (born before 1953) and highest 1% (born after 1993) of mother cohorts 
excluded from the graph. Desired family size computed as the sum of responses to questions about ideal number of boys and ideal number of girls. 
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Figure A2
Distribution of Birth Years Across Survey Waves
Data from our regression sample of Table 2, drawn from NFHS2 and NFHS4.
Figure A3
Electoral Constituencies and Administrative Districts
Source: http://www.uttarpradesh.election2017results.in/ghaziabad/loni_uttar_pradesh_assembly_election_2017.html
Figure A4:  Continuity in Candidate Characteristics
A: Candidate is college-educated B: Candidate did not complete high school
C: Any serious criminal charge filed against candidate D. Log net worth of candidate
